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HATE SPEECH LAWS, LEGITIMACY, AND 
PRECAUTION: A REPLY TO  
JAMES WEINSTEIN 
Alexander Brown* 
Ronald Dworkin once remarked to me that he thought 
Robert Nozick was a highly skilled defender of the indefensible. I 
have the impression from reading James Weinstein’s interesting 
article that this is partly how he sees defenders of hate speech 
bans.1 This is not how I see myself, of course; which is to say, I see 
myself as neither especially skilful nor as defending the 
indefensible. Indeed, given that, as I attempted to show in my 
recent book,2 not only does virtually every person on the planet 
live under at least some form of hate speech law but also such law 
is marked by great internal variety, I rather suspect that what is 
indefensible is either rejecting or defending hate speech law en 
masse. I hope to bring this out in my contribution to this 
symposium.3 
There is much in Weinstein’s article to contemplate, but I 
shall limit myself to making the following four main points. First, 
I believe that debates concerning the normative standing of hate 
speech law are always improved by heeding the internal variety of 
 
 * Reader in Political and Legal Theory, University of East Anglia (UEA), UK. I 
am tremendously grateful to Professor Weinstein for inviting me to join this special edition 
and for numerous constructive and candid exchanges during the course of writing my reply. 
 1. James Weinstein, Hate Speech Bans, Democracy, and Political Legitimacy, 32 
CONST. COMMENT. 527 (2017). 
 2. ALEXANDER BROWN, HATE SPEECH LAW: A PHILOSOPHICAL EXAMINATION 
(2015). 
 3. I shall not, however, attempt a detailed analysis of the concept of hate speech, 
nor comment on which groups ought to be protected by hate speech laws. For more on 
these thorny issues, see Alexander Brown, What is Hate Speech? Part 1: The Myth of Hate, 
36 L. & PHIL. 419 (2017); Alexander Brown, What is Hate Speech? Part 2: Family 
Resemblances, L. & PHIL. (online first, https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s10982-
017-9300-x); Alexander Brown, The “Who?” Question in the Hate Speech Debate: Part 1: 
Consistency, Practical, and Formal Approaches, 29 CAN. J.L. & JUR. 275 (2016); Alexander 
Brown, The “Who?” Question in the Hate Speech Debate: Part 2: Functional and 
Democratic Approaches, 30 CAN. J.L. & JUR. 23 (2017). 
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such law, and although I can see something of that same care in 
Weinstein’s article, such as when he distinguishes between 
different forms of hate speech law based on relative detriment to 
the legitimacy of so-called downstream laws, in some instances 
this care is lacking. Second, Weinstein plays up the importance of 
collective authorization or democratic legitimacy of downstream 
laws vis-à-vis “(a) the obligation of those restrained by the speech 
restriction to obey a downstream antidiscrimination law; and (b) 
the morality of enforcing the downstream measure against those 
whose participatory rights have been impaired by the upstream 
speech restriction.”4 These may be important aspects of what it 
means to detract from the legitimacy of downstream laws, but 
they do not exhaust the relevant aspects. Third, I think that 
Weinstein’s article ignores some important nuances in what I have 
argued about hate speech laws and political legitimacy, and 
ignores something that might be true of the relationship between 
political and democratic legitimacy, namely, it might be that 
political legitimacy takes lexical priority over and, therefore, 
cannot be traded off against, the collective authorization or 
democratic legitimacy of downstream laws. Finally, I believe that 
in describing my use of the precautionary principle as “plainly 
indefensible” Weinstein has done justice neither to the raw 
plausibility of that principle nor to how I applied it to the special 
silencing effects of hate speech. 
I plan to make the aforementioned points in the course of 
responding to two main objections that Weinstein levels against 
the arguments I made concerning hate speech regulations and 
political legitimacy in Chapter 7 of my book. The first objection 
concerns my response to Dworkin’s argument that if we introduce 
“upstream” hate speech regulations and thereby “intervene too 
soon in the process through which collective opinion is formed,” 
then “we spoil the only democratic justification we have for 
insisting that everyone obey these [downstream] laws.”5 I argued 
in response to Dworkin that there might also be a sense in which 
hate speech bans are not a threat to but a requirement of political 
legitimacy. I suggested that the question of the political legitimacy 
of, say, the legal system, might turn on whether the legal system 
could be the subject of interpersonal justification and consensus 
 
 4. Weinstein, supra note 1, at 535. 
 5. RONALD DWORKIN, Foreword, in EXTREME SPEECH AND DEMOCRACY v, viii 
(Ivan Hare & James Weinstein eds., 2009). 
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among free and equal citizens. More precisely, I said “that 
political legitimacy, including the legitimacy of the legal system, 
itself depends upon its being possible, at least in principle, to 
justify that system to each citizen bound by it on the basis of 
fundamentals of justice that they cannot reasonably reject.”6 I also 
proposed that 
members of minority or vulnerable groups could reasonably 
reject the following justification of an absolutist free speech 
doctrine. “For fear that hate speech law may put at risk the 
collective authorization . . . of downstream laws from which you 
benefit, we shall neglect to utilize the measures at our disposal 
to curb forms of hate speech that can be corrosive of a shared, 
public sense of the basic elements of your reputation, status 
and dignity as members of society in good standing.”7 
I believe that this attempt to justify an aggressive free speech 
regime to the victims of hate speech would fail because they would 
rightly see it as violating fundamentals of justice. By 
“fundamentals of justice” I mean, following Waldron’s definition, 
“propositions establishing everyone’s right to justice and 
elementary security, everyone’s claim to have their welfare 
counted along with everyone else’s welfare in the determination 
of social policy, and everyone’s legal status as a rights-bearing 
member of society.”8 These are, I believe, basic propositions that 
everyone can, and should, be willing to accept, and that, under 
certain circumstances, will constitute grounds for reasonably 
rejecting an aggressive free speech regime. 
However, Weinstein objects that despite my having provided 
a legitimacy-based argument for hate speech bans, I have 
nevertheless failed to provide a like-for-like legitimacy-based 
argument in response to Dworkin. In order for a legitimacy-based 
argument to have traction against Dworkin’s contention that 
upstream hate speech bans can spoil the legitimacy of 
downstream laws then, such an argument must also work at the 
level of the legitimacy of downstream laws, claims Weinstein. In 
his words, 
even on the assumption that failure to enact hate speech laws 
does compromise legitimacy, it is, as Brown notes, the 
 
 6. BROWN, supra note 2, at 208. 
 7. Id. 
 8. Jeremy Waldron, Dignity and Defamation: The Visibility of Hate, 123 HARV. L. 
REV. 1596, 1626, n. 127 (2010). 
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legitimacy of “the legal system” that has been diminished, not 
the obligation to obey or the morality of an enforcement of a 
particular law or laws. . . . It is difficult, however, to weigh a loss 
to systemic legitimacy against a detriment to the legitimacy of 
a particular law. The work done by these two types of 
legitimacy is very different. The concern of systemic legitimacy 
is, as Brown notes, identification with the legal system. In 
contrast, the concern about the legitimacy of a particular law 
that I have emphasized in this article is whether it is moral for 
the state to use force to make dissenters comply with a law with 
which they can reasonably disagree.9 
Weinstein has missed some important nuances in what I said 
about political legitimacy, however. For one thing, what I actually 
said was that “political legitimacy, including the legitimacy of the 
legal system,” itself depends on interpersonal justification and 
consensus among free and equal citizens. I used the term 
“including” in a non-exhaustive way, to mean at least this (but not 
necessarily only this). Indeed, the illustrative example I gave 
focused on the interpersonal justification of what I called “an 
absolutist free speech doctrine,” which is only one feature of the 
system of law, albeit an important one. It is an open question 
whether a failure to justify this feature would constitute not just a 
deficit in the legitimacy of this feature but also a deficit in the 
legitimacy of the entire legal and political system. This would 
depend on whether the legal and political system as a whole could 
be the subject of interpersonal justification and consensus among 
free and equal citizens, given attempts to justify the totality of its 
constitutional laws, civil rights laws, public policies, and so on. At 
any rate, I believe that the question of political legitimacy based 
on interpersonal justification and consensus among free and equal 
citizens can be meaningfully applied to particular features of the 
legal and political system, including both upstream and 
downstream laws, as well as to the entirety of that system. 
This clarification is important for understanding what I 
would say about the legitimacy of downstream laws such as those 
involved in Waldron’s English landlord example. Waldron asks us 
to image a landlord who discriminates against English families of 
South Asian descent in a way that is prohibited by English 
antidiscrimination laws. At the same time, English hate speech 
laws, such as laws banning the stirring up of racial hatred, prevent 
 
 9. Weinstein, supra note 1, at 577. 
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the landlord from using threatening, abusive or insulting words or 
behaviour with either the intention or likelihood of stirring up 
hatred against Pakistanis defined as a racial, ethnic or national 
group.10 Whereas Dworkin claims that upstream laws can spoil the 
legitimacy of downstream antidiscrimination laws—laws that 
protect the very people who are also protected by the upstream 
laws—Waldron contends that “if we had a law that was 
specifically tailored to prohibit only expression at the viciously 
vituperative end of this spectrum, it might be an open question 
whether it would have anything more than a minimal effect on 
legitimacy.”11 Weinstein criticises Waldron for intimating that the 
detriment to the legitimacy of the downstream law could prove to 
be “minimal.”12 But he also criticises me for failing to provide a 
like-for-like legitimacy-based argument in response to Dworkin.13 
However, I believe that my account of political legitimacy does 
have the wherewithal to say something about the political 
legitimacy of downstream laws based on interpersonal 
justification and consensus among free and equal citizens. 
Specifically, I think that it is quite possible to justify an 
antidiscrimination law even to those people who disagree with it 
and who are denied certain specific types of opportunities (but not 
all types of opportunities) to publicly argue against it. It might go 
something along these lines. “You have an obligation to obey 
antidiscrimination laws, and we have a moral right to enforce 
antidiscrimination laws, for the simple reason that the state has a 
duty to fight injustice and it is clearly unjust to discriminate 
against people in their access to jobs, housing, transport, services, 
and so forth, merely because of their possession of protected 
characteristics, and, what is more, you have this obligation, and 
we have this moral right, even if hate speech laws reduce to some 
extent the collective authorization of these very same 
antidiscrimination laws and therefore diminish the democratic 
legitimacy of these laws, keeping in mind the fact that we are 
 
 10. Waldron, supra note 8, at 1643. 
 11. Id. at 1646. 
 12. Weinstein, supra note 1, at 532, and subpart A of Part III. Note, however, that 
whilst Weinstein claims these hate speech laws are detrimental to legitimacy, he stops short 
of saying that such laws would actually remove the landlord’s normative obligation to obey 
the law and the state’s moral right to enforce the law against him. Ibid. So despite 
Weinstein’s baulking at Waldron’s use of the word “minimal,” both he and Waldron are 
in perfect agreement that whatever the nature of the detriment to the legitimacy of 
downstream law, it is not ‘catastrophic.’ Waldron, supra note 8, at 1642. 
 13. Weinstein, supra note 1, at 575–78. 
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utilising narrowly framed hate speech laws to curb forms of hate 
speech that can be corrosive of a shared, public sense of the basic 
elements of people’s equal status and dignity as members of 
society in good standing, and corrosive of people’s sense of 
physical security.” I believe that such an attempt to 
interpersonally justify the antidiscrimination law would succeed 
because it appeals to fundamentals of justice that nobody can 
reasonably reject. 
There is another, related nuance that Weinstein has missed. 
In my book I presented the process of interpersonal justification 
and consensus among free and equal people as a way of assessing 
hate speech law from “the sole perspective of political 
legitimacy.”14 I made it clear that “[t]his is not about trading off 
political legitimacy with the assurance of civic dignity but about 
the way in which the assurance of civic dignity is constitutive of 
the realization of political legitimacy.”15 In a similar vein, pace 
Weinstein’s interpretation, I am not attempting to “weigh a loss 
to systemic legitimacy against a detriment to the legitimacy of a 
particular law.” Rather, I am claiming that the upstream hate 
speech law is politically legitimate only insofar as it could be the 
subject of interpersonal justification and consensus among free 
and equal people and, similarly, that the downstream 
antidiscrimination law is politically legitimate only insofar as it 
could also be the subject of interpersonal justification and 
consensus among free and equal people. This holds true even if 
the downstream law suffers diminished democratic legitimacy due 
to the politically legitimate upstream law. So this is not about 
weighing a loss to systemic legitimacy against a detriment to the 
legitimacy of a particular law. Rather, it is about recognising the 
appropriateness of iterative applications of the test of political 
legitimacy for the legal system but also for upstream and 
downstream laws, and, furthermore, about placing political 
legitimacy and democratic legitimacy in what might be their 
rightful order of priority. 
Weinstein’s second objection focuses directly on my 
argument that free and equal people could reasonably reject a 
proposal for an aggressive free speech regime that disallows hate 
speech bans, even if the justification for the proposal appealed to 
 
 14. BROWN, supra note 2, at 208. 
 15. Id. 
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the protection of the democratic legitimacy of downstream laws. 
According to Weinstein, this argument underestimates the 
available evidence on the negative impact of hate speech laws on 
the democratic legitimacy of downstream laws. He writes: 
If this article has demonstrated anything, it is that hate speech 
laws as they actually exist, and of the type that Brown thinks 
justified, present much more than some “risk” to “collective 
authorization and legitimacy of downstream laws” from which 
members of these groups benefit. Nor, contrary to Brown’s 
exposition of Waldron’s erroneous view, have they resulted in 
only “relatively minor reduction in the collective authorization 
of downstream laws.” Rather, as discussed in subsections B and 
C of this Part [IV], their effect on legitimacy, both in the 
normative and descriptive sense, is substantial. In light of such 
significant detriment to political legitimacy, even if one accepts 
hypothetical consent as the basis of political legitimacy, there 
is a very real question whether Brown’s hypothetical 
interlocutors could reasonably consider the failure of a 
jurisdiction to enact broad hate speech prohibitions of the type 
Brown defends as contrary to “the fundamentals of justice.”16 
Now I am not entirely certain what Weinstein has in mind 
when he says I defend “broad hate speech prohibitions.” But he 
does give a clue in the footnote attached to the sentence “hate 
speech laws as they actually exist, and of the type that Brown 
thinks justified.” He writes: 
Thus far beyond the ban on highly vituperative hate speech 
that Waldron thinks might be justified, Brown defends bans on 
group defamation (sensu stricto) and on incitement to racial 
hatred, id. at 214. Despite the seemingly limited scope of such 
laws, they have, as I have demonstrated, been used to impair, 
and perhaps in some cases destroy, the legitimacy of 
downstream antidiscrimination laws. See subparts A and B of 
this Part [IV].17 
Nevertheless, I find this to be a strange line of objection given that 
subparts A and B of Part IV of Weinstein’s article in fact have 
nothing to say about group defamation laws (sensu stricto) and 
relatively little to say about incitement to hatred laws (aside from 
one Dutch case heard by the European Court of Human Rights 
(ECtHR) about which I shall say more in a moment). Instead, the 
vast majority of what he says in these subparts concerns 
 
 16. Weinstein, supra note 1, at 576. 
 17. Id. at 576 n.174. 
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expression-oriented hate crimes,18 specifically, public order 
offences involving threatening or abusive words or behaviour, 
that are aggravated by hostility toward people based on their 
possession or perceived possession of certain protected 
characteristics.19 In other words, despite what Weinstein suggests, 
subparts A and B of his article have certainly not “demonstrated” 
that group defamation laws (sensu stricto) and incitement to 
hatred laws have been used to impair or even destroy the 
legitimacy of downstream antidiscrimination laws. 
To expand on this point, I take it that, for Weinstein, the most 
problematic hate speech laws are those that leave little or no 
leeway or room for people to express certain views in other 
permissible ways. In subpart A (Part IV), he cites various 
aggravated public order offences in England and Wales that he 
believes have, as applied, effectively prevented people from 
expressing in public their sincerely held religious view that 
homosexuality is immoral even without using epithets or slurs or 
stirring up hatred.20 Then, in subpart B (Part IV), Weinstein spells 
out what he takes to be the “annihilation” of legitimacy of 
downstream laws associated with such upstream laws. Here he 
claims that people who have been prevented by such upstream 
laws from expressing in public the view that homosexuality is 
immoral no longer have a political obligation to obey downstream 
antidiscrimination laws. What is more, he claims that such hate 
speech laws might even, in worst case scenarios, “render 
immoral” the enforcement of downstream laws against people 
that have been silenced by them. However, these particular sorts 
of hate speech laws, what I call expression-oriented hate crime 
laws, are in fact much broader and more restrictive of speech than 
 
 18. See BROWN, supra note 2, at 35–38. 
 19. For some concrete examples of how such hate speech laws have been used in 
England and Wales, see Brown, supra note 3, at 285–86, 288–89 n.172, 311 n.252. 
 20. Two offences are involved in many of Weinstein’s examples. The first is s. 4A of 
the Public Order Act 1986 (“Intentional harassment, alarm or distress”), which makes it 
an offence for someone to use threatening, abusive or insulting words or behaviour or to 
display any writing, sign or other visible representation which is threatening, abusive or 
insulting, with intent to cause harassment, alarm or distress and thereby causing 
harassment, alarm or distress. The second is s. 5 of the Public Order Act 1986 (as amended 
by s. 57 of the Crime and Courts Act 2013) (“Harassment, alarm or distress”), which makes 
it an offence for someone to use threatening or abusive (as amended) words or behaviour 
or to display any writing, sign or other visible representation which is threatening or 
abusive within the hearing or sight of a person likely to be caused harassment, alarm or 
distress thereby. 
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the group defamation laws (sensu stricto) and incitement to hatred 
laws that I defended in Chapter 7 of my book. So even if these 
expression-oriented hate crime laws have, in their application by 
the police, prosecutors and courts in England and Wales, 
effectively prevented people from even temperately expressing in 
public their view that homosexuality is immoral, the same is not 
necessarily true of incitement to hatred laws in England and 
Wales. Indeed, I would argue that these other, more narrowly 
framed hate speech laws do allow space for people to express 
certain views in other permissible ways.21 
Thus, consider Part 3A of the Public Order Act 1986 (as 
amended by s. 74 of the Criminal Justice and Immigration Act in 
2008), which inter alia sets out various offences relating to the 
stirring up of hatred on grounds of sexual orientation. It is 
narrowly framed in at least two important ways. First, it is written 
in such a way as to ensure that hate speakers have other 
permissible ways of stirring up hatred. This is because the law 
makes clear that the offences are only committed if people 
intentionally use “threatening” words or behaviour or written 
material or public performance of play or recording in order to 
stir up hatred. Non-threatening modes of expression, as well as 
unintentional stirring up, are untouched by these particular 
offences. Second, s. 29JA of Part 3A of the Public Order Act 1986 
(as amended by Schedule 7 of the Marriage (Same Sex Couples) 
Act 2013) directly and explicitly states that people cannot be 
treated as stirring up hatred merely because they engage in 
discussion or criticism of homosexual conduct or gay marriage, for 
instance. This also gives speakers, including speakers motivated 
by sincerely held religious beliefs, some significant leeway to 
express their views on homosexuality and gay marriage without 
prosecution. I would add here that other countries also have 
similar caveats written into their incitement to hatred laws.22 
 
 21. I note that Waldron makes a similar point in his contribution to this symposium. 
See Jeremy Waldron, The Conditions of Legitimacy: A Response to James Weinstein, 32 
CONST. COMMENT. 697, 700–04 (2017). 
 22. In Canada, for example, the part of the criminal code that bans wilful promotion 
of hatred also contains exemptions or permissible defences against prosecution “if, in good 
faith, the person expressed or attempted to establish by an argument an opinion on a 
religious subject or an opinion based on a belief in a religious text.” See s. 319(3)(b) of the 
Criminal Code (as amended by An Act to Amend the Criminal Code (Hate Propaganda) 
of 2004). Likewise, some states in Australia have on the books legislation banning 
incitement to hatred which sets out exemptions for speech that has a religious purpose or 
is motivated by sincerely held religious beliefs. See ss. 11(b)(i) and 11(2) of the Racial and 
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Now, at this stage, Weinstein might point to how incitement 
to hatred laws have been used by the courts in some cases to limit 
or reduce the range of options for expression among hate 
speakers, and that this alone is a significant detriment to the 
democratic legitimacy of downstream laws, even if they have not 
been banned from expressing certain views as such. For example, 
in subpart A (Part IV) Weinstein does cite one example of an 
application of incitement to hatred law. In Glimmerveen and 
Hagenbeek v. Netherlands (1979)23 the ECtHR judged as 
inadmissible applications made by two Dutch nationals who had 
been found guilty by domestic courts of possessing, with intent to 
distribute, leaflets that incited racial discrimination. So if what 
Johann Glimmerveen really wanted to do, as an exercise of his 
right to contribute to public discourse, was to express his views in 
such a way that constitutes incitement to racial discrimination, 
then he was not able to do so. In that sense his range of options 
were limited or reduced. Or consider the English case R. v. Ali, 
Javed, and Ahmed (2012),24 which is not discussed by Weinstein. 
In July 2010, three devout but also socially conservative members 
of the Muslim faith distributed leaflets on the streets of Derby 
titled “Turn or Burn,” “GAY – God Abhors You,” “Death 
Penalty?,” as a protest to the Gay Pride Festival taking place that 
day. They became the first people to be successfully prosecuted 
for offences relating to stirring up hatred on grounds of sexual 
orientation in England and Wales. In his sentencing remarks 
Judge Burgess made reference to the aforementioned clause 
29JA, but nevertheless supported the jury’s decision that in this 
particular case the wording of the leaflets did amount to the use 
of threatening words or behavior with the intention of stirring up 
hatred, based on the fact that four homosexual men had read the 
leaflet and “[a]ll felt threatened.”25 In that sense the intervention 
by the police and courts did limit or reduce these religionists’ 
range of options in how they could permissibly express their view 
that homosexuality is a sin punishable in ways indicated in their 
religious texts. Maybe what Weinstein would say about this case 
is exactly what he says about some of the cases he presents in 
 
Religious Tolerance Act 2001 (Vict.) and see ss. 80G(1)(b)(i) and 80G(1)(b)(i) (as 
amended by s. 6 of Law No. 80 of 2004) (W. Austl.). 
 23. App. No. 8348/78 & 8406/78, 18 Eur. Comm’n H.R. Dec. & Rep. 187 (1979). 
 24. No. T20110109 (Derby Cr. Ct.) (involving offences of stirring up hatred on 
grounds of sexual orientation). 
 25. Transcript obtained directly from Judge Burgess. 
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subpart A, Part IV, namely, that these speech restrictions 
“effectively prevented these citizens from participating in the 
public discussion of a host of antidiscrimination measures, as well 
as of proposals to extend marriage to include same-sex couples, in 
an intellectually honest and authentic manner.”26 
However, I believe that even if incitement to hatred laws 
do prevent some people from participating in public discourse in 
an intellectually honest and authentic manner, that is, in a manner 
of their choosing or in ways that perfectly express who they are as 
people and what they believe in, and even if this prevention 
thereby has a detrimental impact on the collective authorization 
and democratic legitimacy of downstream laws, free and equal 
people would nevertheless still have grounds to reasonably reject 
a failure to enact and apply such laws, which is a matter of political 
legitimacy. Whether the rejection is reasonable depends not 
simply on what they are rejecting but also on the grounds of, or 
reasons for, that rejection. To understand why free and equal 
people could reject even a free speech regime that aggressively 
protects the democratic legitimacy of downstream laws, it is 
necessary to comprehend the gravity of the relevant grounds or 
reasons. It seems to me that free and equal people might 
reasonably look upon the adequate protection of their equal civic 
dignity, such as via group defamation laws (sensu stricto), as a 
precondition of any notional agreement to joining the political 
community. This precondition is no less than what free and equal 
people would stipulate as the sort of basic status or standing they 
must retain in order for them to be willing to join together to form 
a political community with everything this joining together also 
entails about submitting to governmental institutions and a 
system of law that assumes an obligation to obey the laws because 
they are the laws and that claims a moral right to enforce the laws. 
Perhaps there are other fundamentals of justice, such as 
safeguarding people’s sense of their physical security, that is, 
freedom from legitimate fear of acts of discrimination or violence, 
that are also preconditions for any notional agreement to joining 
the political community, and that would also require laws, 
including incitement to hatred laws, that combat hate speech that 
contributes to a climate of fear.27 
 
 26. Weinstein, supra note 1, at 562. 
 27. BROWN, supra note 2, at 66–75. 
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Now suppose for the sake of argument that I am correct to 
say that a regime of free speech that disallowed group defamation 
laws (sensu stricto) and incitement to hatred laws could be 
reasonably rejected on the grounds that it permitted the sorts of 
hate speech that can jeopardise people’s sense of their equal civic 
dignity and even their sense of physical security. What does this 
mean for the political legitimacy of a political community that 
routinely strikes down such hate speech laws? In brute terms, it 
means that the community is less politically legitimate than it 
could be. But what implications follow from this vis-à-vis 
characteristic aspects of political legitimacy? Following 
Weinstein’s lead, we might consider (a) a lesser normative 
obligation to obey certain laws and (b) a lesser moral right of the 
state to enforce certain laws. These do not, however, exhaust the 
possibilities. Take also (c) people having grounds on which to 
regret the loss of legitimacy and to strongly condemn the 
government concerned, (d) a right to engage in acts of civil 
disobedience short of disobeying justifiable laws, (e) a lesser 
obligation to support the system of law as a whole, once again 
short of breaking justifiable laws (for example, tax avoidance or 
arranging one’s financial affairs to minimise tax liability within the 
law), and even (f) a lesser obligation to refrain from taking the 
law into one’s own hands in the sense of enforcing hate speech 
norms that ought to be enshrined in law but are not (for example, 
making threats of extrajudicial punishment against hate 
speakers). Unfortunately, I do not have up my sleeve a theory that 
can easily tell us which of these implications are most fitting for 
political communities that unjustifiably fail to enact and apply 
incitement to hatred laws, for example. But I do want to make the 
point that no adequate discussion could begin and end with an 
assessment of (a) and (b) alone. 
I now turn to Weinstein’s second main objection. This 
objection concerns the fact that in my book I also invoked the 
precautionary principle in order to justify, or supply further 
justification for, certain forms of hate speech law. Specifically, I 
argued that 
an authority may adopt laws forbidding hate speech when it 
amounts to discriminatory harassment in the workplace or on 
campus, or laws interdicting hate speech when it constitutes 
discriminatory intimidation, because having identified the 
possibility of the catastrophic antidemocratic outcome that a 
proportion of the individuals targeted by hate speech will not 
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participate in the formation of public opinion, and bearing in 
mind the conditions of uncertainty that surround these 
outcomes, it errs on the side of precaution.28 
I was certainly not the first scholar to appeal to the 
precautionary principle as a justification for the regulation of hate 
speech. In her 2008 article, “A Constitutional ‘Right’ to Deny and 
Promote Genocide?,” for example, Karen Eltis appealed to the 
principle as a way of both reinterpreting and defending the 
Supreme Court of Canada’s decision in R v. Keegstra.29 This case 
involved a prosecution of an openly anti-Semitic school teacher 
for the crime of wilful promotion of hatred under s. 319(2) (ex s. 
281.2(2)) of the Criminal Code.30 According to Eltis, “the majority 
opined that hate speech can serve as a precursor to genocide and, 
through its ruling, advocated a precautionary approach to denial 
and incitement.”31 A similar precautionary justification also seems 
to have played a part in the thinking of the Kenya National 
Commission on Human Rights (KNCHR) in the course of its 
work monitoring the 2005 Constitutional Referendum and 2007 
General Elections and in pushing through new incitement to 
hatred laws in Kenya.32 It is also implicit in Mari Matsuda’s most 
recent article on hate speech.33 Genocide is not the only applicable 
harm. For instance, Richard Posner has argued that incitement to 
racial and religious hatred might constitute a long term threat to 
national security of sufficient magnitude to warrant legal 
sanctions even in the U.S.—on the evidence that heightened 
levels of incitement to hatred against American Muslims increases 
the risk over the long term of terrorist attacks by American 
Muslims on home soil—even if we do not know exactly how long 
it would take for the risk of a terrorist attack to significantly ramp 
up.34 Whilst Posner does not endorse the precautionary principle, 
 
 28. Id. at 199. 
 29. [1990] 3 S.C.R. 697 (Can.). 
 30. Karen Eltis, A Constitutional “Right” to Deny and Promote Genocide? Pre-
empting the Usurpation of Human Rights Discourse Towards Incitement from a Canadian 
Perspective, 9 CARDOZO J. CONFLICT RESOL. 463 (2008). 
 31. Id. at 476. 
 32. See Lawrence Murugu Mute, Legislation, Hate Speech, and Freedom of 
Expression in Kenya, PAMBAZUKA NEWS (Oct. 22, 2008), www.pambazuka.org/govern
ance/legislation-hate-speech-and-freedom-expression-kenya. 
 33. Mari J. Matsuda, Is Peacemaking Unpatriotic?: The Function of Homophobia in 
the Discursive World, 11 J. HATE STUD. 9, 9–10 (2013). 
 34. RICHARD POSNER, NOT A SUICIDE PACT: THE CONSTITUTION IN A TIME OF 
NATIONAL EMERGENCY 124 (2006). 
3 - BROWN.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 10/1/17  9:53 AM 
612 CONSTITUTIONAL COMMENTARY [Vol. 32:599 
 
what he is suggesting is a sort of cost-benefit analysis that builds 
in a margin of safety when it comes to risks of temporally distant 
but especially serious harms.35 
The sorts of harms that Eltis, the KNCHR, and Posner have 
in mind (genocide, terrorist atrocities) are grave and irreversible. 
They are equivalent to the devastating climate change harms that 
are associated with the precautionary principle in the field of 
environmental regulation. Of course, the sorts of harms that I 
focused on in Chapter 7 of my book are not of the same magnitude 
of gravity as these. Nevertheless, they are potentially more 
probable harms and more proximate harms, causally speaking. 
While they are not strictly irreversible (as with loss of life), they 
are not easily reversible. And whilst less grave, they are still 
extremely serious. I am speaking of the antidemocratic outcome 
that a proportion of the individuals targeted by hate speech will 
not contribute to public discourse nor participate in the formation 
of public opinion, or will do so but with speech the content of 
which has been warped, or will do so but without the ability or 
power to achieve intended illocutionary or perlocutionary 
effects.36 (Of course, the precautionary principle might also be 
applied to other types of hate speech law that address other 
categories of extremely serious harm other than the 
aforementioned antidemocratic outcome.37) According to 
Weinstein, however, my “invocation of the precautionary 
principle in lieu of evidence . . . turns a problematic though 
plausible argument into a plainly indefensible one.”38 
 
 35. Id. at 122. See also RICHARD POSNER, CATASTROPHE: RISK AND RESPONSE 
(2004). 
 36. For an overview of the literature, see BROWN, supra note 2, at 84–86, 198. 
 37. For example, the principle could potentially be invoked to justify laws disallowing 
the use of epithets or insults directed at or targeted against individuals based on their 
possession or perceived possession of protected characteristics, such as if such speech had 
the potential to cause in a proportion of those subject to it serious psychological damage, 
such as anxiety or distress, or to exacerbate the symptoms of pre-existing mental illnesses, 
such as depression, or to trigger the onset of mental illnesses to which individuals may have 
already been at risk, such as antisocial personality disorder, even if there was a lack of 
decisive or consensus-based evidence to prove these effects. Id. at 49–58. Or, to take 
another example, the principle might be invoked to justify laws banning incitement to 
hatred if such speech had the potential to significantly contribute to the production and 
maintenance of a climate of hatred which is partly constituted by an increased chance of 
acts of discrimination, violence, damage to property, and so forth, even if there was a lack 
of decisive or consensus-based evidence to prove this contribution. Id. at 66–75. 
 38. Weinstein, supra note 1, at 580. 
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According to the strong version of the precautionary 
principle I had in mind, the main burden of proof is placed not on 
those wishing to regulate or support the regulation of potentially 
harmful activities but on those who wish to engage in or support 
those activities. It is they who should demonstrate that the 
activities would not produce significant harms if left unregulated, 
based on evidence that is sufficiently rigorous, comprehensive and 
abundant to command a consensus among the relevant body of 
experts. The upshot is that the principle may require regulation of 
activities because there is lack of consensus-based evidence that 
the activities would not produce significant harms if left 
unregulated. It goes without saying, however, that there must be 
at least some minimally adequate evidence that the relevant 
activities have certain effects and that these effects are potentially 
harmful in order to shift the burden in this way. I believe that this 
threshold has been met for hate speech and various types of 
silencing effect.39 But it is not necessary for the evidence of harm 
itself to be consensus-based. 
At any rate, the crux of Weinstein’s objection to my 
invocation of the precautionary principle is his assertion that 
there is a worrying asymmetry between the regulation of hate 
speech that has certain or known harmful effects, measured in 
terms of some speakers’ reduced opportunities to contribute to 
public discourse and participate in the formation of public 
opinion, and the justification of such regulation in the name of 
preventing only possible or potential harmful effects, measured in 
the same way (only focusing on the subjects of hate speech). He 
writes: 
The view that bigots can be forbidden by force of law from 
expressing their views—which will, if the law has any effect at 
all, undoubtedly have a “silencing effect” on them—to avoid 
the possibility that some unspecified “proportion of the 
 
 39. In other words, I do not accept the premise (present in some objections to hate 
speech laws) that there is a paucity of evidence (i.e., not a minimally adequate level of 
evidence) of harmful silencing effects. See BROWN, supra note 2, at 98–99. For evidence of 
silence (or passivity) as a common response to, and effect of, hate speech, see, e.g., Laura 
Leets, Experiencing Hate Speech: Perceptions and Responses to Anti-Semitism and Antigay 
Speech, 58 J. SOC. ISSUES 341 (2002), and Katharine Gelber & Luke J. McNamara, 
Evidencing the Harms of Hate Speech, 22 (3) SOC. IDENTITIES 324 (2016). For an analysis 
of what silencing means in terms of harmfully removing real opportunities to participate 
in the formation of public opinion, see, e.g., BROWN, supra note 2, at 194–208. I would like 
to thank the journal’s editor, Jill Hasday, for suggesting I make these important 
clarifications, which I had not made in the original version of my contribution. 
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individuals targeted by the hate speech” might be deterred 
from speaking is simply impossible to square with the basic 
premise underlying participatory democracy that all citizens 
should have the equal opportunity to engage in the formation 
of public opinion regardless of the viewpoint they want to 
express.40 
Of course, the known harmful effects of hate speech 
regulations are not limited to reducing the speakers’ opportunities 
to contribute to public discourse and participate in the formation 
of democratic public opinion.41 But, to focus on the democratic 
harms, I believe that in addition to the asymmetry between 
certain and potential effects, there is another asymmetry that 
Weinstein either ignores or underestimates, and that makes the 
invocation of the precautionary principle more not less justified. 
The asymmetry I have in mind is in the nature of the silencing 
effect at issue. When the state intervenes to criminalise certain 
forms of hate speech, narrowly framed laws will curtail only that 
given form of speech. Such laws, sensibly and properly applied, 
will not stop the speaker from expressing him or herself in other 
permissible ways. As mentioned above, if laws prohibit the use of 
threatening words or behaviour to stir up hatred, then hate 
speakers can perform the same speech acts in other ways, using 
other kinds of words or behaviour. So, for example, a hate speaker 
might be banned from saying this. “You think you can trust 
Muslims, think again, they are vile, backward, and dangerous 
people who deserve only our hatred, and when this country is 
finally united in its hatred of Muslims, they had better watch out!” 
But he might not be banned from saying this. “You think you can 
trust Muslims, think again, they are vile, backward, and dangerous 
people who deserve only our hatred.” By contrast, in the event 
that hate speech has a silencing effect on those who are its 
subjects, the effect is just that, silence; it can cause people not to 
speak in any way. Of course, Robert Post is very convincing when 
 
 40. Weinstein, supra note 1, at 580. 
 41. Other harmful effects include a reduction of negative freedom to engage in hate 
speech and thereby to pursue self-development (for example, truth discovery, self-
realisation). See BROWN, supra note 2, at ch. 4. Then there is the loss of formal autonomy. 
Hate speech regulations substitute a governmental choice for a personal choice about how 
and when to embody one’s values in speech, including a personal choice as to what is 
appropriate and what is inappropriate public speech. See, e.g., C. Edwin Baker, Hate 
Speech, in THE CONTENT AND CONTEXT OF HATE SPEECH: RETHINKING REGULATION 
AND RESPONSES 57, 63–64 (Michael Herz & Peter Molnar eds., 2012). For further 
discussion, see BROWN, supra note 2, at 210–13. 
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he states that part of the point of the First Amendment is to 
protect citizens’ right to choose the ways, manner, and 
circumstances of their participation in the formation of public 
opinion.42 But surely another, perhaps even more fundamental 
purpose of a regime of free speech is to ensure that all citizens 
enjoy at least sufficient real opportunities to participate in public 
discourse.43 
It seems to me that part of the raw intuitive appeal of the 
precautionary principle stems from the idea that we ought to be 
better safe than sorry. When it comes to hate speech harms it is 
also important to attend closely to who the “we” are, and what 
harm they face. It is precisely because the nature of the harm 
(silencing) is different for hate speakers and those people who are 
the unwilling subjects of hate speech that it is not impossible to 
square the precautionary approach with the principle that all 
citizens should have sufficient real opportunities to engage in the 
formation of public opinion. Perhaps Weinstein thinks that any 
application of a strong version of the precautionary principle is 
plainly indefensible. If so, then the grounds for his objection takes 
him well beyond the hate speech debate and, more importantly, 
his objection requires significant bolstering, well beyond his brief 
remarks in the article.44 
Building on his two main objections, Weinstein ends with an 
offer to rescue my arguments. He writes: “I will build on some of 
Brown’s better arguments to try to identify a countervailing 
legitimacy concern sufficiently similar in type and character to the 
 
 42. See, e.g., Robert Post, Reconciling Theory and Doctrine in First Amendment 
Jurisprudence, in ETERNALLY VIGILANT: FREE SPEECH IN THE MODERN ERA 153, 167 
(Lee C. Bollinger & Geoffrey R. Stone eds., 2002); Robert Post, Democracy and Equality, 
1 L., CULTURE & HUMAN. 142, 148 (2005). 
 43. See BROWN, supra note 2, at 194–201. 
 44. For general criticisms of the precautionary principle in various spheres of law and 
regulation, see CASS SUNSTEIN, LAWS OF FEAR: BEYOND THE PRECAUTIONARY 
PRINCIPLE (2005); Stephen G. Wood et al., Whither the Precautionary Principle? An 
American Assessment from an Administrative Law Perspective, 54 AM. J. COMP. L. 581 
(2006); and STEVE FULLER & VERONIKA LIPINSKA, THE PROACTIONARY IMPERATIVE: 
A FOUNDATION FOR TRANSHUMANISM (2014). For a defence, see Timothy O’Riordan & 
Andrew Jordan, The Precautionary Principle in Contemporary Environmental Politics, 4 
ENV’T. VALUES 191 (1995); Marko Ahteensuu, Defending the Precautionary Principle 
Against Three Criticisms, 11 TRAMES 366 (2007); David A. Dana, The Contextual 
Rationality of the Precautionary Principle, 35 QUEEN’S L.J. 67 (2009); and Nassim Nicholas 
Taleb et al., The Precautionary Principle (With Application to the Genetic Modification of 
Organisms) (NYU Sch. of Engineering Working Paper Series, Sep. 4, 2014), 
https://arxiv.org/pdf/1410.5787.pdf. 
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legitimacy that I have argued is diminished or destroyed with 
respect to downstream legislation, and which, therefore could, at 
least theoretically, offset this deficit.”45 He then proffers the 
following interesting case. 
Suppose, for instance, that in a certain democratic country the 
legislature is considering whether to grant an exemption from 
its drug laws to members of an indigenous population to use a 
substance traditionally employed by this group in religious 
ceremonies. Suppose that it is also the case that hate speech 
against this group, long subject to discrimination by the 
European settlors and their descendants, is so rampant and 
virulent that many members of this vulnerable minority group 
are “out of fear for their personal safety or livelihood” 
reasonably deterred by the hate speech from publicly 
supporting the exemption. If the exemption is not passed, then 
members of this indigenous community might well feel, and 
aptly so, that they have no political obligation to obey a law 
against ingesting the drug as part of their religious ceremony.46 
However, Weinstein does not go on to actually defend what I 
attempted to defend, namely, banning the hate speech in 
question. He claims that “[i]t must be further demonstrated that 
the gain in legitimacy produced by the hate speech ban at least 
marginally exceeds the detriment to legitimacy caused by the 
speech restriction.”47 
I believe that Weinstein misunderstands what is really at 
stake here. For one thing, his talk of gains in democratic 
legitimacy produced by the hate speech ban offsetting the 
detriment to democratic legitimacy caused by the speech 
restriction is anathema to what I see as the basic proposition 
underlying participatory democracy and democratic legitimacy. 
The real touchstone is ensuring that all citizens enjoy at least 
sufficient real opportunities to contribute to public discourse and 
participate in the formation of public opinion. I also think that it 
makes perfect sense to ask whether or not this basic proposition 
or touchstone can itself claim political legitimacy, based on the 
test of interpersonal justification and consensus among free and 
equal citizens. The question is: would free and equal people have 
reasons based on the fundamentals of justice to reject an 
aggressive free speech regime that treated hate speech as a 
 
 45. Weinstein, supra note 1, at 580. 
 46. Id. at 580–81. 
 47. Id. at 581. 
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protected category even though certain forms of hate speech carry 
a risk of effectively removing from some people who are the 
subject of hate speech real opportunities to contribute to public 
discourse and participate in the formation of public opinion? 
Moreover, I believe that by refocusing the debate about hate 
speech law onto the question of obligations to obey downstream 
laws, Weinstein has overlooked a far more important question. 
Why should people who are subject to hate speech and 
interpersonal silencing be put in a position of having to think 
about whether they have no political obligation to obey 
downstream laws, much less of having to contemplate disobeying 
these laws as a means of addressing the diminished democratic 
legitimacy of those laws? To fall into this way of thinking about 
their predicament risks imposing three harms on the victims of 
hate speech: first, the harm of being subject to silencing hate 
speech, as in, hate speech that, due to its psychological as well as 
material effects, freezes them out of contributing to public 
discourse and participating in the formation of public opinion; 
second, having a decision about downstream laws go against them 
partly because they did not contribute to public discourse and 
participate in the formation of public opinion; and third, the harm 
of having to engage in potentially risky forms of civil disobedience 
simply to make their point. Adopting the aforementioned ideal of 
political legitimacy as well as the precautionary principle as 
justifications for effective and narrowly drawn hate speech 
regulations means that victims of hate speech may be spared this 
triply unenviable position. 
